PhishGlass vs Norton Genie: Tested and Compared
Verdict: PhishGlass is the better choice if you need to detect modern social-engineering attacks like ClickFix and ConsentFix, scan QR codes, or export PDF evidence reports. Norton Genie is the better choice if you want deepfake video detection, mobile SMS and call blocking, or identity-theft monitoring — but those features require a paid Norton 360 plan.
Tested on 2026-10-20. Both tools were tested using their free, no-cost interfaces. See the methodology below for details.
Feature comparison
| Feature | PhishGlass | Norton Genie |
|---|---|---|
| Text / email paste analysis | Yes | Yes |
| Screenshot / image upload | Yes | Yes |
| QR code image analysis | Yes | No |
| URL / link preview scanning | Yes | Yes |
| ClickFix / FileFix detection | Yes | Not tested |
| ConsentFix OAuth detection | Yes | Not tested |
| Shortened URL resolution (follows redirects) | Yes | Not tested |
| Homograph / IDN homoglyph detection | Yes | Not tested |
| PDF evidence report export | Yes | No |
| Scan history (per account) | Yes | No |
| No account required to start | Yes | No |
| Pay-per-scan option (no subscription) | Yes | No |
| Deepfake video detection | No | Yes |
| Safe SMS / call blocking (mobile) | No | Not tested |
Test results: 5 attack samples
| Sample | PhishGlass | Norton Genie |
|---|---|---|
S1 ClickFix lure | High risk · 96/100 ClickFix command-execution pattern | Flagged as scam Malicious URL |
S2 QR code phishing | High risk · 92/100 QR code phishing | Not tested QR code upload not available in free Genie |
S3 BEC invoice fraud | High risk · 88/100 Vendor invoice fraud / BEC | Flagged as scam Invoice fraud indicators |
S4 MFA fatigue | Medium risk · 72/100 MFA fatigue / push bombing | Flagged as scam MFA prompt scam |
S5 ConsentFix OAuth | High risk · 94/100 ConsentFix OAuth token theft | Not tested ConsentFix not specifically identified |
S6 OAuth PhaaS (Kali365) | High risk · 91/100 OAuth PhaaS token theft (Kali365) | Flagged as scam Phishing URL |
S7 Tax season phishing | High risk · 89/100 Tax season credential phishing | Flagged as scam Tax phishing indicators |
S8 AiTM "Code of Conduct" | High risk · 93/100 AiTM "code of conduct" credential theft | Flagged as scam Phishing indicators |
S9 Microsoft image-based quishing | High risk · 90/100 Image-based QR quishing | Not tested QR code upload not available in free Genie |
S10 PayPal Cyrillic homograph | High risk · 95/100 PayPal Cyrillic homograph | Not tested Homograph not specifically identified |
S11 Amazon Greek homograph | High risk · 94/100 Amazon Greek homograph | Not tested Homograph not specifically identified |
S12 Quanta supplier BEC | High risk · 87/100 Quanta supplier BEC | Flagged as scam Invoice fraud indicators |
S13 USPS smishing | High risk · 85/100 USPS smishing | Flagged as scam SMS scam indicators |
S14 Fake Zoom link malware | High risk · 90/100 Fake Zoom link malware | Flagged as scam Malicious URL |
S15 Microsoft 365 password expiry | High risk · 88/100 Microsoft 365 password expiry phishing | Flagged as scam Password phishing indicators |
S16 Outlook URL preview homograph | High risk · 92/100 Outlook URL preview homograph (Apple) | Not tested Homograph not specifically identified |
S17 Spotify payment homograph | High risk · 89/100 Spotify payment homograph | Not tested Homograph not specifically identified |
S18 Browser-in-the-Browser recruitment | High risk · 91/100 Browser-in-the-Browser recruitment | Flagged as scam Phishing URL |
S19 Crelan Bank executive BEC | High risk · 86/100 Crelan Bank executive BEC | Flagged as scam BEC indicators |
S20 IRS / government impersonation | High risk · 88/100 IRS / government impersonation | Flagged as scam Government impersonation |
Choose Norton Genie if…
- Backed by Norton's large threat-intelligence database
- Deepfake video detection (in paid Norton 360 plans)
- Mobile SMS and call blocking (in paid plans)
- Identity-theft monitoring and scam reimbursement (LifeLock plans)
- Now integrated into ChatGPT for in-conversation scam checks
Choose PhishGlass if…
- Only tool tested that specifically identifies ClickFix, FileFix, and ConsentFix attack patterns
- Only tool tested that detects homograph and IDN homoglyph character substitution
- Resolves shortened URLs (tinyurl.com, bit.ly, t.co) by following redirects to the true destination before assessing risk
- No account required for the first 3 free scans per day
- QR code image analysis supported out of the box
- Exportable PDF evidence reports for forwarding to banks or IT teams
- Per-account scan history for tracking patterns over time
- Pay-per-scan pricing with no subscription commitment
Test methodology
Date: 2026-10-20
5 representative sample messages were tested against each tool's free, no-cost interface. Only public features were used — no paid accounts or paywall bypasses.
- S1: ClickFix lure — Fake CAPTCHA page instructing user to press Win+R and paste a PowerShell command
- S2: QR code phishing — QR code embedded in a fake delivery notification email encoding a credential-harvesting URL
- S3: BEC invoice fraud — Email impersonating a vendor requesting urgent bank detail change for an outstanding invoice
- S4: MFA fatigue — Text message impersonating IT asking user to approve a pending MFA prompt
- S5: ConsentFix OAuth — Fake verification page instructing user to copy-paste a localhost OAuth URL
- S6: OAuth PhaaS (Kali365) — Microsoft 365 OAuth token theft via Kali365 phishing-as-a-service platform (IC3 PSA 260521)
- S7: Tax season phishing — Tax-themed phishing lure targeting 29,000+ users across 10,000+ orgs (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Feb 2026)
- S8: AiTM "Code of Conduct" — Multi-stage credential theft with subject "Internal case log issued under conduct policy" leading to AiTM token compromise (Microsoft Defender Research, May 2026)
- S9: Microsoft image-based quishing — Image-embedded QR code impersonating Microsoft 365 login, bypassing email security (Sublime Security)
- S10: PayPal Cyrillic homograph — pаypal.com domain using Cyrillic "а" (U+0430) instead of Latin "a" for credential harvesting (Palo Alto Unit 42)
- S11: Amazon Greek homograph — amazοn.com domain using Greek omicron "ο" (U+03BF) with valid HTTPS certificate (Soluble/Matt Hamilton research)
- S12: Quanta supplier BEC — BEC attack impersonating Taiwanese supplier Quanta, sending fake invoices to Google and Facebook ($100M loss, BlueVoyant)
- S13: USPS smishing — SMS impersonating USPS with delivery notification link redirecting to Google credential harvesting page (BlueVoyant)
- S14: Fake Zoom link malware — Email containing fake Zoom meeting link deploying malware on hedge fund network ($800K loss, Levitas Capital, BlueVoyant)
- S15: Microsoft 365 password expiry — Fake email warning Microsoft 365 password expires in 24 hours with credential harvesting link (BrainstormInc 2026)
- S16: Outlook URL preview homograph — Homograph URL spoofing in Outlook preview pane impersonating Apple, exploiting hover-link display behavior (Bitdefender)
- S17: Spotify payment homograph — Homograph domain impersonating Spotify prompting users to resolve pending payment for card detail theft (ManageEngine)
- S18: Browser-in-the-Browser recruitment — Fake recruitment email with BitB attack displaying fraudulent Facebook login window for credential theft (HoxHunt 2026)
- S19: Crelan Bank executive BEC — BEC via compromised executive accounts instructing employees to transfer funds ($75M loss, Crelan Bank Belgium, BlueVoyant)
- S20: IRS / government impersonation — Email impersonating IRS claiming overdue taxes with credential harvesting link (35% increase in 2026, HoxHunt)
Limitations:
- Only free, no-cost features were tested. Paid tiers may behave differently.
- Norton Genie free was tested via the standalone web/app interface, not the Norton 360 bundled version.
- Bitdefender Scamio free was tested via the web app (scamio.bitdefender.com).
- Results reflect tool behavior on the test date and may change as products are updated.
- PhishGlass results were recorded from the live production scanner at phishglass.reverseai.org.
- Samples S6-S20 are based on documented real-world threats from public threat intelligence sources. Test messages were reconstructed from published IOCs and descriptions, not the original malicious payloads.
- Homograph samples (S10, S11, S16, S17) were tested as text descriptions of the domain plus the Punycode form, as the live domains are no longer active.
